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Comments already filed with the FCC by interested parties pursuant
to this inquiry have urged a total exemption of all commercial advertise-
ments from the operation of the fairness doctrine. 7 1 Others have suggested
that licensees be required to set aside 20 per cent of all commercial time
for the presentation of counter-commercials coupled with the opening up
of all commercial time for paid editorial advertisements. 179
Whatever the outcome, the court's remarks in Business Executives'
Move jbr Vietnam Peace might be appropriate:
We are convinced that the time has come for the Commission to
cease abdicating responsibility over the use of advertising time.
Indeed, we are convinced that broadcast advertising has great po-
tential for enlivening and enriching debate on public issues, rather
than drugging it with an overdose of non-ideas and non-issues as
is now the case.'
JOHN C. MOORE
NON-TENURED TEACHERS AND DUE PROCESS:
THE RIGHT TO A HEARING AND STATEMENT OF
REASONS
The bounds of academic freedom and the rights to be afforded mem-
bers of the teaching profession have been recurring problems in the history
of American education.' One aspect of the problem has been the recent
concern over the due process rights to be afforded non-tenured 2 public
' 'BROADCASTING, Oct. 18, 1971, at 88.
19 d. at 90.
'ONo. 24,492 at 3 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1971).
1R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1956).
2Adoption of tenure statutes by most states was in response to the teaching profession's
desire for stability of employment and protection from political dismissals. See R. HOFSTAD-
TER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 456-
57 (1956); Stover, The What and Why of Tenure, NEA JOURNAL, March, 1961, at 47. The
following are state statutes containing tenure provisions: ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 352 (1960);
ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150 (1971); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-251 (Supp. 1971); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 13304 (West 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-18-3 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 10-151(b) (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.36 (Supp. 1971); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 297-9 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1212 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-
11 (Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 284511 (Repl. Vol. 1970); IowA CODE ANN. § 279.13
(Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5404 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.720 (1969);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:442 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 161 (1964); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 77, § 114 (Repl. Vol. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 41 (1971);
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school teachers upon non-renewal of their teaching contracts or dismissal
from a school system.3 While there is little doubt that a teacher cannot
be discharged for reasons that are constitutionally impermissible, such as
the exercise of first amendment rights,4 the present legal controversy cen-
ters around the claim by such teachers that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment5 requires a statement of reasons for the termina-
tion of their employment and a hearing to determine the validity of the
reasons.
Two valid interests are brought into conflict by this controversy: the
interest of the school system in maintaining an efficient and qualified
faculty and the individual teacher's interest in preserving an untarnished
reputation in a profession where reputation is important. 6 The difficulty
of resolving these interests is reflected in the fact that four United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal, in ruling on the question within the past two
years, have failed not only to reach a uniform result, but even to agree
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.1991 (Rev. Vol. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 125.17 (1960); Mo.
STAT. ANN. § 168.221 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 75-6103 (Repl. Vol.
1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1256 (Repl. Vol. 1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:14a
(Repl. Vol. 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-5 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-8-11 (Repl.
Vol. 1968); N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 2573 (McKinney 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15-
47-27 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 6-122 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.845(1) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 11-1121 (1962); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-13-3 (1969); S.D. CODE ANN. § 13-43-
10 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1402 (Repl. Vol. 1966); TEx. EDUC. CODE
§ 21.206 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-
217.3 (Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-2-2 (Repl. Vol. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.23 (West Spec. Pamphlet 1970); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-155 (Supp. 1971). Dela-
ware, Washington, and Nevada do not have formal tenure statutes, but afford rights to a
statement of reasons and a hearing to all teachers: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1411, 1413
(Supp. 1970); NEV. REv. STAT. § 391.130 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE§ 28.67.070 (Supp.
1970). Once tenure is granted, a teacher may be dismissed only for "cause," which is usually
gross misconduct as defined by the statute. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 231.36(6) (Supp. 1971)
provides: "[C]harges must be based on immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency,
gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness, or conviction of any crime
involving moral turpitude."
3Frakt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 27 (1969).
4Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
5U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
6Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (Ist Cir. 1970); see also Van
Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L.J. 841, 858-
74 for a broader discussion of the interests protected by procedural due process for teachers.
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on the proper method of approach. 7 The federal district courts 8 and the
two state supreme courts which have decided the question9 are in equal
disarray. This split of authority may soon be resolved by the Supreme
Court, since certiorari has been granted in a case directly relating to this
problem."
DUE PROCESS IN RELATED AREAS
Much of the reasoning in the cases involving the rights of non-tenured
teachers can be better understood after an examination of law relating to
the due process rights of governmental employees generally," the special
status of professionals and others whose reputations are important in
maintaining employment, 2 and the special status afforded the educational
process by the courts." Decisions in these areas have been relied upon by
the courts in cases involving teachers' rights.
The traditional view saw government employment as a gratuity to be
freely revoked at the will of the employer." This view was partly a product
of pre-civil service days when the few government jobs available were
allocated and later terminated by means of the spoils system. It was given
a type of logical formalism by means of the privilege doctrine, which held
that government employment was a privilege, not a right, and therefore
not entitled to legal protection.' 5
'Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 227 (1971);
Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.), petition for cert.filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3126 (U.S. Aug.
18, 1971) (No. 71-249); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (Ist Cir. 1970);
Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970).
'In favor of the teacher's right to a hearing are: Gouge v. Joint School Dist., 310 F.
Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969) (the court
vigorously asserting the rights of the teacher, but circumventing the problem by requiring
reinstatement). Contra, Johnson v. Fraley, 327 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1971); Toney v.
Reagan, 326 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (the court avoiding merits by deciding that
preexisting administrative procedures were adequate); Schultz v. Palmberg, 317 F. Supp.
659 (D. Wyo. 1970); Bonner v. Texas City Indep. School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Tex.
1969).
'Both of the state courts deciding this question have held against the teacher: Fooden
v. Board of Governors, Nos. 42460, 42461 (111. Sup. Ct., March 1970, modified, March 3 1,
197 1), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. June 29, 1971) (No. 71-354) (state-
ment of reasons denied); Munro v. Elk Rapids Schools, 383 Mich. 661, 178 N.W.2d 450
(1970) (statement of reasons denied).
"°Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 227 (1971).
"See text accompanying notes 14-37 infra.
"2See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
"See S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 426-27 (1965).
15K.C. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 172-76 (1969).
NOTES
The best enunciation of the privilege doctrine, and certainly the most
quoted, is the statement of Oliver Wendell Holmes in the case of
McAulijft v. Mayor of New Bedford. 6 'Holmes, then on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, said: "The petitioner may have a consti-
tutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman."'" Apparently, the petitioner had no right to government em-
ployment, and his continued employment was subject solely to the will of
the government.
8
The general doctrine as pronounced by Holmes long permeated the
thinking of the federal courts. Exemplary of this view is the 1951 case of
Bailey v. Richardson," where the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the dismissal of government employees was a
function of Congress and the executive, and not of the judiciary.20 Re-
sponding adversely to the appellant's claim that she was entitled to a
hearing under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 21 the court
said that government employment is not life, liberty, or property under
the fifth amendment, and therefore no due process rights were infringed. 2
The Bailey view that government employment was an easily termi-
nated privilege, while conceptually logical, created harsh results in actual
practice.23 Consequently, the doctrine underwent considerable ferment
after Bailey, being criticized by scholars 24 and challenged quite frequently
in a series of loyalty cases in the 1950's.21 The doctrine was tempered
considerably by these cases, as evidenced by the 1961 decision of Cafeteria
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy.26 Although the Supreme Court held that
the right to a hearing for a government employee was not self evident, it
"155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). Plaintiff was a policeman removed from the New
Bedford force after an investigation showed he was engaged in political activity in contraven-
tion of police department regulations.
'11d. at 517.
"Holmes followed his initial statement with, "On the same principle, the city may
impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control." Id. at 518. This
language apparently indicates that he did not mean the privilege doctrine to be an absolute,
but rather that governments could impose reasonable restrictions as a public policy.
11182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir.), af['d by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (195 1).
"182 F.2d at 56.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part that, "No person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
2182 F.2d at 58.
"See I K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.11 (1958).
?A1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.1 1-.13 (1958). See Davis, The
Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REV. 193, 233-43 (1956); Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
24E.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educa-
tion, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
-367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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did go so far as to say that a court must make a careful examination of
the respective interests of each party to determine whether a hearing was
called for.
In CaJfteria Workers, petitioner had been employed as a cook in a
privately owned concession on a government weapons facility for six
years. Upon finding that the cook lacked the needed security clearance,
the security officer in charge of the facility revoked her entry card and
thereby terminated her employment. After being refused a hearing, peti-
tioner brought an action for restoration of the card.27 The district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, and this action
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.2
The Supreme Court addressed itself to the question of whether there
was a denial of due process under the fifth amendment. In a statement
that seemed to disparage the privilege doctrine, the Court said that the
question could not be resolved by the assertion that the petitioner had no
constitutional right to be at the facility. 29 The Court emphasized that
while a trial-type hearing is not a constitutional requirement,"0 the essence




The Court stated that to determine what constitutes due process in any
given situation, the nature of the governmental function must be balanced
against the private interest affected by the government's action.32 In
applying this balancing test to the case at hand, the Court noted that the
cook was denied only a specific job at one government installation.3
Therefore, the private interest affected was not the right to follow a partic-
ular trade or profession; 3 no badge of infamy was attached to the cook
because of the dismissal.3 5 Weighed against this private interest, the
Id. at 887-89.
-'Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 284 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
"Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961). The Court quoted
Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961): "One may not have a constitu-
tional right to go to Baghdad, but the government may not prohibit one from going there
unless by means consonant with due process of law." 367 U.S. at 894.
wThe Court cited as authority Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
3 The Court cited as authority Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Joint Anti-
Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950) (concurring opinion); Communications
Comm'r v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 11I U.S. 701
(1884).
32367 U.S. at 886.
3Id. at 896.
uThe Court cited as authority Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
WIThe Court cited as authority Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1951); Joint Anti-
Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950).
NOTES
government function was viewed not as the power to regulate an entire
profession, but rather a proprietary power under which private interests
have traditionally been held to be subject to the plenary power of the
executive. 6 Having weighed the competing interests, the Court held that
the cook was not entitled to a hearing.
7
The conclusion of Cafeteria Workers might have been different had
the petitioner been engaged in a profession or other employment where
reputation is tantamount to employment itself. In such areas of employ-
ment, the courts have recognized that special due process rights apply.
The Supreme Court has long held that a state cannot exclude a person
from law,"8 medicine, 39 or any other profession4" or occupation 4 in an
arbitrary manner or for reasons that violate due process or equal protec-
tion. Members of the educational profession have been held to have simi-
lar rights, and the Supreme Court has placed emphasis on the protection
of the constitutional rights of teachers. 2 Generally, the courts have re-
garded the campus as a unique place,4 3 and spoken of the special status
of scholarship and teaching.44
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE RIGHTS AFFORDED NON-TENURED
TEACHERS
A classic application of the balancing test required by Caftteria
Workers45 to the due process rights of non-tenured teachers is the First
Circuit case of Drown v. Portsmouth School District.6 The court under-
took a detailed analysis of the benefits and burdens that would be placed
4The Court cited as authority Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Oceanic Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320
(1909); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
3367 U.S. at 899.
$Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 9 (1856).
"Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
4 0Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (notary public).
4'Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (insurance salesman).
'"Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
0 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). The Court wrote, "[T]his Court
will always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected
domain." Id. at 112.
14See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). Despite this emphasis,
however, the Court has not made academic freedom subject to special scrutiny. See Develop-
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1065 (1968).
"See text accompanying notes 26-37 supra.
16435 F.2d 1182 (Ist Cir. 1970).
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on each party by requiring that the teacher be given a statement of reasons
for termination,4 7 and held:
[T]he interests of the non-tenured teacher in knowing the basis for
his non-retention are so substantial and . . . the inconvenience and
disadvantages for a school board of supplying this information are
so slight as to require a written explanation, in some detail, of the
reasons for non-retention, together with access to evaluation re-
ports in the teacher's personnel file.4 8
With regard to the teacher's demand for a hearing, the court engaged in
a similar analysis but reached the opposite result, holding that in this
instance the potential burden on the board outweighed the advantages to
the teacher.4 9
The Seventh Circuit, in Roth v. Board of Regents,50 agreed that
Cajeteria Workers requires courts to balance the interests of the board
and the teacher. It differed from the Drown court in its assessment of
where the balance lay, however, and held that due process requires both a
statement of reasons and a hearing. The court distinguished the facts from
those in Cajeteria Workers,5 stressing that more than a single job was
involved:
We think the district court properly considered the substantial
adverse effect non-retention is likely to have upon the career inter-
ests of an individual professor and concluded, after balancing it
"rThe court felt that the benefits to the teacher of such a statement would be as follows:
the ability of the teacher to correct a decision made on mistaken facts; the possibility of dis-
covering evidence that would substantiate a claim that employment had been terminated
due to constitutionally impermissible reasons; the ability of the teacher to learn for future
reference where his performance failed to live up to standards; and the fact that the reasons
for non-renewal could actually be a cause for recommendation to another employer. The
requirement of a statement of reasons was not seen as inflicting a significant burden upon
the school board in that there would be no great administrative burden; the board could
still rid itself of incompetents; an objective of the board is to help teachers improve their
teaching; and the problem of the creation of friction between administration and teacher is
moot when the decision not to rehire has already been made. Id. at 1184-85.
18ld. at 1185.
"The teacher's interests were viewed as: the opportunity to improve his methods; the
identification of factual mistakes; and the protection of constitutional rights. Weighed
against these interests were the board's interest in the need for wide discretion in the employ-
ment and discharge of teachers, the need to keep expensive administrative machinery to a
minimum, and the ill effects of leaving rehiring decisions to third party review boards. Id.
at 1185-87.
-446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 227 (197 1).
51The court said that "Cafeteria Workers itself suggests that if the government action
jeopardized a right to follow a chosen trade or profession, that fact would weigh upon the
side of the individual." Id. at 809.
NOTES
against the governmental interest in unembarrassed exercise of dis-
cretion in pruning a faculty, that affording the professor a glimpse
at the reasons and a minimal opportunity to test them is an appro-
priate protection.
52
In sharp contrast to the liberal outlook of Roth is the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Orr v. Trinter,0 which denied both a statement of reasons and
a hearing, citing the privilege doctrine as enunciated in Bailey v.
Fergusons' as a justification. This reliance on Bailey is surprising, since
the more flexible doctrine of Cafeteria Workers seems to have superseded
that case. As a second reason for its decision, the court relied on the
existence of the state's tenure system:
In conclusion we emphasize that an essential feature of State
teacher tenure laws is to require a teacher to serve a probationary
period before attaining the rights of tenure. State statutes prescribe
the rights of tenured teachers to written charges, public hearings
and judicial review. The determination as to whether the quality
of services of a particular teacher entitles him to continued employ-
ment beyond the probationary period, thereby qualifying him for
tenure status, or whether his contract of employment should not
be renewed prior to attainment of tenure status, is the prerogative
of the employer, the Board of Education. In the present case Orr
seeks to persuade this court to render a decision which would
confer certain tenure privileges upon non-tenured teachers-in ef-
fect to amend the Ohio statute by judicial decree. This we decline
to do."
The Fifth Circuit, in Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction,56 also relied
on the existence of the tenure system in denying a hearing in a case where
the statement of reasons was not an issue. The Fifth Circuit used its own
approach in evaluating the conflicting interests. This approach, developed
521d. There was a strong dissent to the Roth opinionwhich argued against the majority
opinion for several reasons. The decision was felt to be unworkable from an administrative
viewpoint. It was also felt that the distinction between tenured and non-tenured teachers
would be destroyed. A final reason cited by the dissent for its disagreement is that it
considered the majority to have gone beyond the present state of the law as set forth by the
cases of Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970), and
Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
843 (1969).
1444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.),peitionforcert.filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3126 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1971)
(No. 71-249).
5See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra.
"1444 F.2d at 135.
"432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970).
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by earlier Fifth Circuit cases with related facts, 57 consists of a determina-
tion by the court as to whether the plaintiff belongs to a certain class of
teachers to whom the court feels legal protection should be afforded.
The Fifth Circuit affords the right to a hearing and a statement of
reasons apparently to three classes of teachers: those who are discharged
for constitutionally impermissible reasons; those who hold tenure under
state statutes; and those deemed by the court to have an expectancy of
employment.5" The doctrine of expectancy, which is similar to the contract
theory of reliance, was promulgated by the Fifth Circuit to protect teach-
ers who reasonably expected to be reemployed due to a particular policy
or practice of the institution.
This unique approach was applied in Thaw, and the teacher was found
not to belong to any of the favored classes. He did not have tenure because
his three year period of employment was less than the statutorily required
four years.5 9 In addition, the institution had established no policy that had
given the teacher an expectancy of employment. Lastly, no constitution-
ally impermissible reasons were alleged to be the cause of termination.60
To properly evaluate the due process claims of non-tenured teachers,
the balancing of interests test must be employed."' In such a determina-
tion, the pervasive influence of the tenure system will weigh heavily on the
side of the school board."2 While the distinction between tenured and non-
tenured teachers that the tenure system makes does not appear to be
subject to direct attack, 3 it does not follow that the existence of the tenure
system precludes extension of due process rights to persons unprotected
by the system. When the fundamental fairness required by due process is
taken into account, 4 the controlling question is not, as some courts
6 5
apparently believe, whether the system will be altered by the extension of
some rights associated with tenure to non-tenured teachers. Rather, the
51Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970); Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 403 U.S. 917 (1971); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1970).




6 See text accompanying notes 26-37 supra.
"Statutes cited note 2 supra.
"See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d
806, 813 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 227 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
"See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ("[Dlue process embodies the differ-
ing rules of fair play. ... ); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I, 19 (1938) ("[T]hose
fundamental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process ... ").
6Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.), petition for cert.filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3126 (U.S.
Aug. 18, 1971) (No. 71-249); Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.
1970).
NOTES
primary concern would seem to be the extent to which such changes would
frustrate the underlying legislative purpose.
It is in this context that the reasoning of the courts in Orr" and Thaw
67
regarding the right to a statement of reasons appears faulty. These courts
have taken a rigid approach, which strikes at the fundamental fairness and
flexibility6" that are the heart of due process. The effects-whether
substantial or inconsequential-that a statement of reasons would impose
upon the tenure system were not examined.
When the effects of a required statement of reasons are examined, it
seems clear that little harm will be done to the system by this addition.
The purpose of the scheme-the maintenance of a competent faculty
-will not be affected, for the school board's freedom not to renew a
teacher's contract will be unaffected. The only adverse effect is the slight
administrative problem of processing the statement of reasons, and this
is little different from the statement of notice that most systems currently
require. 9 That a statement of reasons will not harm the tenure system is
evidenced by those states which currently afford such a right to probation-
ary employees, with no apparent adverse effect.
7
1
However, the imposition of a hearing seems to have the opposite effect.
Roth7 l incorrectly assumed that the controlling issue was the reputation
of the teacher. While this may be important, it does not adequately assess
the effect of a required hearing. While a statement of reasons imposes no
appreciable burden, an effective hearing procedure with a modicum of due
process requires considerable machinery-an impartial tribunal, the right
to counsel, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 71 Moreover,
the rehiring decision would be vested in a group having a primary concern
other than that of quality education. These factors, which Roth has ig-
nored, would place considerable strain on the tenure system as currently
in operation in most states, particularly at a time when funds for the
machinery outlined above are limited.
When claims of teachers are evaluated by means of the balancing of
"See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
'uSee text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
"'Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (concurring opinion); Communications Comm'r v. WJR,
337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708-09
(1884).
19E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (Supp. 1971).
70E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.845 (1969) provides that "In case the district school
board does not renew the contract . . . the board shall furnish a statement of the reason
for non-renewal to the teacher or administrator."
7 See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
7Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1183 n.I (1st Cir. 1970).
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